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The knowledge and understanding of kaleidoscopic and hypermodern societies rely heavily 
on the term “recognition.” This term carried a great deal of significance in the Russian philo-
sophical tradition, but attracts less attention now. The main purpose of this paper is to offer 
a contribution to the discussion on this topic, by considering both the Russian and the Euro-
pean philosophical traditions, with specific reference to the Italian perspective. The methodo-
logical focus is concerned with the two essential aspects of recognition: that of the interper-
sonal and that of the group. Our philosophical analysis of recognition endeavors to take into 
account first and foremost the problematic field of Otherness. The process of recognition of 
the Other is thus considered according to three stages of approval: cognitive, moral and social. 
Cognitive approval includes the identification of the Other as opposite to the group as well as 
to each individual. The moral stage contemplates concretization of social objectives and ac-
cepting the Other as a whole that should above all be respected and accepted. At the stage of 
social approval, the individual is being recognized within the social context of a group (closed 
social group) as recognition or rejection. Specifying the recognition leads to a reduction in 
the number of conflicts, the clarification of borders, and the acceptance of Otherness as an 
element of individuality. The contribution to the theory of recognition here outlined is new 
to the Russian scientific context, and may prove challenging in the context of Russian-Italian 
dialogue. It also constitutes an attempt to compare the common representations of Otherness 
with current theoretical developments. The theory is illustrated by analysis of closed social 
groups functioning as a promising series of case studies, in order to open up a renewed inter-
est in research into social reality theories in both Russian and Italian contexts.
Keywords: recognition, acceptance, Other, identity, closed social groups.
Premise. Recognition in Russian Philosophy and Culture
In this paper, we carry out the philosophical analysis of the concept of recognition in 
the contexts of post-structuralism. First, we provide an overview of the evolution of the 
* The reported study was funded by RFBR (Russian Foundation for Basic Research) according 
to the research project “The problem of identity in cultural exclusion zones in the urban environment” 
No. 18-011-00552.
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term “recognition” in the European philosophical tradition. After that, the comparison 
between Western approaches and the studies on recognition in Russia is made. The major 
part of the paper contains the theory of three stages of recognition as the result of the 
international philosophical dialogue. We test our method according to the current social 
reality and illustrate each stage with examples of closed social groups.
The category of “recognition” at the current moment is not very popular in Russian 
research ethics and social philosophy fields, whereas it is currently central in the fast mov-
ing world of hypermodern. Contemporary reflection of the theme in the European philo-
sophical tradition has grown in its intensity. The description of the concept in general was 
improved, the elaboration arose and derivations were developed.
Identity and recognition traditionally were researched both in the “neoHegelianist” 
context  [1, p. 23] (proper in Hegel philosophy and his French followers in XX century 
A. Kojeve and J. P. Sartre) and in the “intersubjective” interpretation of P. Ricoeur. In the 
Russian philosophical tradition the concept of recognition usually was understood as ac-
ceptance. In the process of recognition, a large part is taken by the sense of perception. 
As Russian philosophy has such an ethical and religious nature, the issue of recognition 
is treated by Russian philosophy as an individual act. That also means that the aim of the 
recognition lies inside the person, even if the subject of the recognition is another person, 
it should be accepted inside of the one who is recognizing.
The first person who brought up the problem of recognition in Russian philosophy 
was Nikolay Fedorov. As an advocate of cosmism theory, he insisted on the necessity of 
recognizing each person who lives or lived on the planet, the so-called “recognition with-
out exception” [2]. Fedorov’s research on psychocracy was formed as a doctrine about the 
proper realization of religious heists: “the one God’s son doctrine… calls all the people 
to recognize themselves as the sons of all dead fathers, grandsire, ancestors. Such under-
standing is a history without exceptions, without the people who are not worth remem-
bering…” [3, p. 94].
Contemporary Russian scholar F. Devyatinin explains that through our involvement 
in society, there is a common consanguinity. He also notes that there is an ability to in-
clude the Other in an understanding of yourself and to develop yourself in the way he or 
she is possible as a being [2]. The recognition in Fedorov’s theory of Recognition, in this 
case implies not only acceptance of the whole history in the person, but also acceptance of 
including the person into the whole historical process. After recognizing the Others (both 
dead and alive), humanity implies this construction in itself. This allows it to expose and, 
at the same time, to understand itself. To reach it, the individual and humanity in general 
need to reproduce themselves from the elementary components. Fedorov also underlines 
that it is necessary to reproduce humanity neither as a model nor as a short or simplified 
version of itself, but through individualities, in all its complexity.
The recognition without exceptions can also be illustrated with the extensional theory 
of P. Florensky, who claims that we could not exclude a thing from its surroundings. Dur-
ing the perception of it we need to take into account the corresponding reality [4]. Thus, 
to recognize a thing, it is necessary to include perception of it in one’s mind. This principle 
allows us to express that recognition without exceptions is not only morally imperative, 
but also the condition of the existence of a single human being.
We can find another concept of recognition in the erotic theory of N. Berdyaev. He 
divides the love into three types, the first and the second of which are mostly common, 
Вестник СПбГУ. Философия и конфликтология. 2020. Т. 36. Вып. 1 143
love as Care and love as Eros. The difference is in the attitude to the object of love. Love as 
Care is love that goes down to its object, while the love as Eros exalts it. The love as Eros 
sees the Other that is loved in God’s eyes and sees the beauty of the beloved. The compas-
sionate love sees the Other in god-forsakenness, in the darkness of the world, in suffering 
and in ugliness [5]. However, both of these types of love could not be accepted as the true 
ones from Berdyaev’s point of view. The love as Eros in its extreme limits the freedom of 
the Other, as well as the freedom of the lover. But love as Care is not better for the person-
ality. True love is the love in oeuvre, as it is an oeuvre (according to Berdyaev) that you see 
in your favourite one the image of God. This oeuvre-love is the love of Christ, where the 
lover needs to recognize their beloved as a brother or a sister in the celestial father. This 
recognition allows them to understand the personality of the beloved and feel the mysti-
cal insight of the Other. Again, we have here the concept of recognition as including the 
perception of the Other in recognising the mentality of personality, feeling, sympathy, and 
acceptance of the Other in itself.
The most comprehensive research on the current term in Russian philosophy was 
conducted by I. Ilyin. He contemplated recognition in the stream of law theory. Recogni-
tion (priznanie) here is, once again, closer to the acceptance in English, to recognize the 
subject matter of the legal awareness, the recognition should come “from the conscien-
tiae,” but not “from the fear” [6]. The philosopher distinguished the free sense of law from 
the slave’s understanding of it. The servile understanding implies “considering” (prizna-
vat’) the law. Ilyin claims that if person has such a type of understanding of the law, they 
would delinquent the rule first; they have the opportunity to do it. Sense of the law, for 
this person has stopped on external legacy. The understanding of the law as the external 
rule remains immature according to Ilyin. Such a sense of the law will motivate the slave 
to seek egress or speculation possibilities. Recognition from fear results in obeying the 
law, but does not accept it. The slave would divide the world into friend-and-foe and try to 
realize all covered motives beside the edges. While the main principle of the law in Ilyin’s 
understanding is Justice (and equality, as the main part of the concept of justice). Only 
recognition of the law “from conscientiae” [6], the free Recognition is not humiliating, it 
should find the reason of itself in a person’s will. This Recognition, as Ilyin states, can arise 
only from free will or will that is self-respectful. Thus, the recognition in Ilyin’s law theory 
is again based on irrational understanding, on the comprehension of the phenomenon in 
general and including this understanding in the concept of living. The Ilyin law theory 
claims to recognize the law subjectively, intentionally, while the law tradition is a tradition 
of objective rules. The rules are created by other people and reinforced by the external 
power. However, while the rules are external, Ilyin says that the perception of the idea of 
law should come from the person himself [6].
Russian philosophers had not paid much attention to the term recognition, which 
often occurs in texts, but had not been examined. Recognition (priznanie) in most ways 
is understood as acceptance (prinyatie) and brought in the ethical context, and the mean-
ing of it is traditionally orthodox. This theory is confirmed in those few pieces, where the 
term is explained. Modern Russian researcher V. Melas explains recognition as “joining a 
group, that recognizes you back. However, the size and the structure of the group, as well 
as the motives of its members, remains unconcerned and the act of joining usually is non-
conscious” [7, p. 200]. Ricoeur is the starting point for his own independent research on 
the contemporary human in the situation of acceptance. “It is important that recognition 
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is not a language game, but the way of existence, based on offering help and on expecta-
tion for support” [7, p. 210]. The point of the recognition, in comparison to openly joining 
a group, is that in the first situation the motives and structure of the group are usually 
unknown and anonymity gives rise to the sensation of veracity, whereas the recognition is 
pretending to be acknowledgment.
In the Russian language the English term “recognition” for a long time corresponded 
to the outmoded priyatie [acceptance], while vospriyatie [perception] is a combination of 
the word root of “acceptance” and the prefix “in-”, which points out that recognition in 
Russian tradition, implies vpushchenie [admission] in the close inner circle. Etymologi-
cally the Russian understanding of recognition developed in the opposite way, compared 
to the European term: from inclusion in the group to enquiring-accepting-understanding 
the Other1.
Recognition in Western Philosophy. A comprehensive view
The first formulation of the problem can be found in the source of all Western phi-
losophy. It was Aristotle who was the first most considerate and observing researcher of 
the recognition phenomenon. He was especially interested in the functioning of recogni-
tion in the context of tragedy narration construction. In The Poetics [8], recognition-
ignorance2 [anagnorisis] is a mutation (as an evolution) from total nescience to compre-
hension. This comprehension results in amicability or animosity towards the individual, 
destined to success or lack of success by destiny.
The classical theory was introduced by Hegel and developed by Charles Taylor and 
Alex Honnet. That said, in a chronological sequence of the thoughts that specify the usage 
of the word reconnaissance (remarked with a stamp of philosophical questioning), Kan-
tian recognitio has an antecedence to Bergson’s reconnaissance and Hegel’s anerkennung [9, 
p. 26]. Thus, Kant’s recognitio theory is superior in special function of the theoretical field 
to this concept. Also based on the Kantian theory, Paul Ricoeur discovered the self-identi-
ty element in the recognition process [9, p. 41]. Descartes and Kant explain recognition as 
identification, to apprehend the meaning singleness in spirit. The category of recognition 
at first upgraded to the rank of philosopheme in the Critique, it is understood as recogni-
tion but in the form of anagnorisis or identification where the recognition could not be 
distinguished from acknowledgement.
The first sure steps of the philosophy of recognition is connected to the enlargement 
of human rights and regarded in two notions, “recognition of the rights of somebody and 
1 It is also interesting that the adjective of priyatie [acceptance] — priyatnyj [pleasant, gratifying] in the 
contemporary Russian language brought important, and, from now, a single meaning in the linguistic base 
of recognition: to be gratifying. While the number of cognate words nepriyatie — negative noun meaning 
‘rejection’ and nepriyatnyj  — negative adjective meaning ‘unpleasant’ barely could be interpreted in the 
wrong way.
2 Recognition as the name indicates is a change from ignorance to knowledge, producing love or hate 
between the persons destined by the poet for good or bad fortune. The best form of recognition is coincident 
with the reversal of intention as in Oedipus. There are indeed three other forms. Even inanimate things 
of the most trivial kind may sometimes be an object of recognition. Again we can recognise or discover 
whether a person has done a thing or not. But the recognition that is most intimately connected with a 
plot and action is, as we have said, the recognition of persons. This recognition, combined with a reversal 
will produce either pity or fear; and actions, producing this affect on those, who by our definition, tragedy 
represents. Moreover, it is upon such a situation that the issues of good or bad fortune will depend. 
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for something” [9, p. 59] (the rights of an individual, designated by its subject matter and 
attribution of these rights for the new categories of individuals or groups). The permanent 
conversion to the phenomenon of recognition (nearly from the middle of the 1980s) can 
mark the necessity of specification or redefinition of the category by composition of the 
so called “argumentum bank”. The formed recognition theory connects the phenomenon 
with the ability to intercommunicate and the ability to act. The theme of recognition itself 
has a tendency to be more of frequent occurrence. The point is that in a “multicultural 
society” there is a specific field of problems, with the lack of a concrete base and objective 
argumentation. In Western theoretical philosophy, discussion of the problem had several 
directions and obtained some updated information.
The structuralistic understanding of Recognition was centred on the results of an-
thropological research, such as recognition based on the binary opposition “us-them” 
of Levi-Strauss [10]. Due to this opposition the concept of identity, of otherness is cre-
ated, to recognise here is to add the Other into any of these groups. Thus, a common un-
derstanding of the recognition is based on anthropological constructions. However, this 
treatment does not correspond with reality. Identity of the individual in contemporary 
society is found in the interrelation between the individual and social groups. Moreover, 
these groups are not as autonomous as traditional tribes. What we are proposing now is a 
modern view, based on the understanding of Otherness through identity. Italian colleges 
propose that we define different types of identities and specify how the recognition is pos-
sible in each case.
Mutual recognition, between personal identity and models of otherness: 
An Italian point of view3
The modern era is increasingly being shaped by an intense albeit frequently unequal 
awareness of difference, diversity, and of otherness. This is undoubtedly one of the most 
significant effects of the comprehensive processes that we implied by the label of globaliza-
tion. However, the perception at close quarters of which, prima facie, may appear to us to 
be incommensurably distant in ethical, cultural, and political terms produces contextually 
a renewed confirmation of the need to define (and re-define) ourselves. An important part 
of the “identity question,” certainly one of the key-concepts of the global age, is contained 
in this context.
An intuitive picture of the pair of concepts identity-otherness (or identity-alterity) 
invites us to think of the first concept in opposition to the second. If one were to stress 
this polarity, it might be expressed in these terms: either I take care of myself (the path of 
identity) or I take care of others (the path of otherness). Within this scheme, there is no 
authentic and autonomous way of identity that does not exclude others.
In this context we will try to show that, from a phenomenological, pragmatic, and 
normative perspective, it is impossible to conceive and, above all, to actually live any iden-
titarian path that cannot be described as other-including, and therefore implicitly or ex-
plicitly, that does not recognise the existence of the other, precisely in order to shape the 
definition of what the individual can be and wants to be. As we’ll explore in this and in the 
3 For more details, see: [11, p. 77–90].
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following paragraphs, this way of framing the issue explicitly envisages the necessity to re-
visit the issue of the concept of recognition and the possible levels of its own articulation.
In addressing the “identity question,” we will begin by considering its natural negati-
vum, i. e. the concept of otherness. This approach may seem odd, but our aim is to begin 
to destabilise the notion of otherness in order to re-introduce it into the individual’s self-
understanding. In particular, we will begin by outlining three forms of otherness, each of 
which is intended as an ideal-type and, as we will show in the following section, each of 
which bears a corresponding relation to individual identity and to the mutual recognition 
between the self and the other.
The first contour of otherness already can be qualified as wall-otherness. Phenomeno-
logically speaking, this contour of otherness precedes any other one. That is to say, the 
Other is ascertained, at first as the edge, or barrier, that prevents our will and our power to 
act. In this first modality, the Other is defined as alien, dissonant, and opposite. The second 
contour of Otherness could be named as the mirror-otherness. The Other is perceived first 
of all as somebody who recognizes us because of our similarity (we mutually recognize 
each other). Our life pattern, value system and purposes of coexisting could be shared 
with this type of Other. This Other is a euphonic Other (similar to a consonant letter) with 
values along similar lines to ours. The third contour is the door-otherness, echoing what 
George Simmel introduced in “The Bridge and the Door” [12]. The door represents a radi-
cal way to distinguish, as well as to unite, and it is two sides of the same coin of unity and 
differentiation. The Otherness of medium unification means that it determines both the 
duality and the individuality. This contour of Otherness allows us to sum up the subtotals.
All three kinds of Otherness enable us to address the question of identity, to answer 
the question “Who am I?” The first contour answers the question ex contrario (“I am not 
the Other”; “I am against the Other”). The second contour implies a convergent type of 
answer, what we could call ex harmony (“I am the same as the Other”). The third contour 
provides for including the Other into our group. Thus, the answer here to the question 
“Who am I?” is the process (I am with and through the Other). The way we formulate the 
experience of ourselves through the procedure resembles the process of development of 
Hegel’s dialectics (thesis-antithesis-synthesis) [13].
Based on these three contours of Otherness we can distinguish at least two corre-
sponding types of identity: the misrecognising identity and the recognising-identity. The 
first concerns the wall and mirror forms of otherness. The identity corresponding to these 
two forms of otherness is one that for the most part misrecognises, or is insufficiently 
aware of the existence of the other within its own experiential and practical field. But the 
misrecognition involved is also distorting, for it involves not only a partial awareness of 
the Other, but also a partial (and in some cases only occasional) respect for them — some-
thing that is particularly significant at the ethical-political level. In turn, the recognising-
identity can be understood accordingly with the third form of Otherness, the door-other-
ness. The recognising identity is therefore that identity which is aware of the unexpected 
opportunity for enrichment that any interaction with the other offers, of the fact that — in 
a relation between subjects who see themselves reciprocally as free and equal — what is 
gained from such interaction is greater than any possible loss in terms of self-presentation. 
Such identity, one might say, “takes the other seriously” because it “takes itself seriously,” 
in the awareness that the self exists only in the constant hermeneutic process that simulta-
neously connects it and distinguishes it from every other that it meets on its path [14; 15].
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Framing the issue in this perspective, the definition of recognition requires new ex-
amples, as is surely offered by the closed social groups theory (office groups, neighbours 
in communal flats, nationalist groups)4. Insofar as CSG has several characteristics specific 
to traditional tribes, the process of recognition is closely related to the blurring of dis-
tinction. Each successive stage allows us to negotiate previous restrictions. These freely 
organised groups function within the framework of the contemporary society, and are free 
to communicate with external social units (such as other individuals and CSG). However, 
they partly preserve features of a closed socium, such as a limited number of members, 
hierarchy inside the group structure, and a specific language. These are the CSG that have 
the greatest influence on the individual. Social networks in these groups are strong and 
stable, so the “microclimate” is carefully preserved by the group’s members from the influ-
ence of the Other. The cases from different spheres of life are held here as examples: neigh-
bours in cohabiting groups (daily and private life), nationalistic society (commonality of 
world view), and office groupings (career).
The process of recognition
It might appear challenging to “enable” a concept of recognition that can be brought 
into dialogue with the Russian perspective that was presented above (and which will be 
further developed below) and, at the same time is capable of being “tuned” with the three 
models of Otherness just outlined. Let us summarize in this context at least three levels of 
recognition which have been articulated elsewhere in more detail [11, p. 77–99, 119–187].
The first level could be framed through the expression of ascertain the Other. The aim 
of this phenomenologically evident level of recognition is an attempt to answer the ques-
tions related to the principium identificationis: “Who is it/What is it?”. This level regards a 
sort of basic epistemology, that is achieved by identification of the Other as “something” 
that comes into contact with us according to the phenomenological way. This way implies 
the ability to identify the Other both as an object in empirical perception and as a being 
acting in a certain way that, in fact, I can “recognize” as its own.
In turn, the second level could be indicated as accepting the Other. The acceptance 
stage has two main vectors, the acceptance of the Other by the whole group, and accept-
ance of the group by the Other. The concept of the acceptance, based on the structuralistic 
duality of friend-or-foe, refers to the multiple forms of the Other’s inclusion in society, 
and from the very beginning potentially conflicting social contexts. However, for the cur-
rent social situation it is ordinary to precept the group homogeneously, individuals who 
are not self or the same, by the roles inside the group or in exterior situations of contact. 
Thus, the group as a social actor exists only in the individual’s perception, in the percep-
tion of Other. Relevant to the context of the contemporary world, representation of the 
recognition process proposes such phenomenon as hetero-acceptation. We will go into 
more details about this point.
Prima facie, by addressing the sphere of the acceptance phenomenon one may be un-
derstood as referring to the concept of tolerance (lat. tolero — sustain the burden). Rather, 
the acceptance of the Other concerns everything that can be qualified as its admission to 
our everyday life. Furthermore and hopefully, it also refers to the multifaceted (and not 
4 Hereafter abbreviated to CSG.
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rarely equivocal) dimension of inclusion of the other in a context of equal respect, or 
within the ideal “community of equals” that we think constitutes one of the characterizing 
nuances of the challenge of living together. We appreciate thus the relevance of a normative 
effort that originates from this concept.
The ascertaince of the Other includes the capability of sketching out, namely, or de-
fining the Other. The second stage implies acceptance “of the otherness” in the Other. As 
can be easily understood, the distinction between the two levels can be realized only in an 
analytical manner, while in the realm of effective agency, the logical and epistemological 
levels will always be interrelated with the normative one.
The cognitive stage is concluded by the definition of the Other, while the normative 
one includes the emphasis of it without any references to the social environment and to 
the acceptation of it by the Other. It this sense, we can affirm that, while recognized, the 
Other not only “exists,” but also “resists” any attempt of assimilation resulting in a full 
redefinition of itself in terms completely internal to the language that is coming from an 
external perspective.
The field of recognition originates from the logical ability of identifying the Other, as 
well as it implies the normative issue of the Other’s acceptance. The normative instance is 
broadly interpreted and echoed, in order to contemplate a comprehensive reference to the 
public sphere that is not possible to develop here further [16]. This reference is related not 
only to the process of including or excluding the Other, but also to the recognition of the 
values that each single Other is embodying, by being aware of it or not.
In these terms, the third level of Recognition is formulated as the one that takes seri-
ously into consideration the preliminary two levels, by increasing the normative expecta-
tions related to the entire process. We could call this level the approval of the Other. This 
stage opens the next degree of complexity. It infers a clear expectation of effective results 
of communication, at times unpredictable or revolting. Here we can observe as ascertaince 
is charged by acceptantive meaning.
The analysis of the acceptance stage encourages us to research first another phenom-
enological evident question: “whose volition is that to be accepted?” (“Who desires the 
acceptance”). Firstly, it presupposes the assertive (or cognitive) stage, that means that the 
Other should be accepted not only as a social member, but as individual capable of act-
ing in a certain way. That is also important to underline, that members who are already 
included into the group do not perceive the group as a homogeneous union, the group is 
perceived as a monolithic being only in the case of interaction with another group or from 
the Other’s point of view.
Nonetheless, at least the second question should be taken into account, which is again 
“who is it?” Answering this question revisits the need of framing the contact with the 
Other accordingly with further modalities. The first of them is related to the approval of 
the Other, by acknowledging that “it should be recognized” in a certain way. It implies an 
attempt to answer two different but interrelated questions:
First, we need to recognize “something of ” this subject. This includes features and 
cultural value specifications (attributes) and practices that are presumed to be legitimate 
and legitimized by being a member of a group. Second, we must recognize “something 
for” this subject, providing concrete meaning that this subject is an individual within this 
specific group, which is also the one to which we belong, too. Some of the “privileges,” 
namely, some predicates and individual attributes should be delegated and some of them 
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need to be approved. Moreover, these privileges should be formulated in a way that allows 
the Other to embrace a possible path of action that could be considered adequate by the 
other members of a group [17].
The next question that needs to be specified, or even the group of questions, concerns 
the problem of recognition for the Other who we have preliminary asserted and accepted. 
The point is that we need to estimate practices and public actions that should be done in 
order to approve the Other as member of our specific group. This refers to Kant’s idea of 
thun und lassen, which inquires what acts or behaviour should the Other undertake and, 
at the same time, which of them should be avoided by them.
In the end, the Other should be able to set up their own identity narrative, that should 
be accomplished according to three rules: it should take into account the social context of 
the CSG; it should avoid the unlimited recognition of the Other’s otherness; last but not 
least, it should be able to maintain a line of separation (or: the way for distinguishing) 
between the self and the group.
Thus, linearity is divided in two vectors; from ascertaince to acceptance, and from ac-
ceptance to approval. While the first one concerns the ethical sphere, first, the second finds 
out its more coherent development in the political and social one.
After having synthetically introduced these modalities, it might be important to ex-
plore their interconnectedness5. Based on theoretical approaches of C. Geertz, the first 
modality can be emphasised by what we could call a categorical imperative for the glo-
balized postmodernity: “We must learn to understand what we cannot embrace” [17]. Such 
a form of imperative should be taken into account in order to adopt the adequate prag-
matic strategy to frame both vectors mentioned above.
If we move towards the second vector, it is easy to acknowledge that acceptance due 
to the Other is defined as measurement of our approval. This perspective exists within a 
unique perspective both in the field of acceptance of the Other and the approval of the 
Other by ourselves. These two cognitive actions are inseparable one from another.
What we could call the categorical imperative for the globalized postmodernity, in this 
case, can be interpreted as the warning of taking responsibility for the diversity of the Oth-
er. There is disappointment or, even, fear for the alternative to us which is pragmatically 
embodied in such a diversity. But the message that we might gain from Geertz’s attempt, is 
the possibility of passing from a preliminary understanding of the Other as an “alternative 
to us,” to the normative understanding of the Other as an “alternative for us,” namely as an 
opportunity of understanding ourselves better and our capability of constructing our per-
sonal identity within a world inhabited by Others, by necessity more or less “close” to us, 
“tuned” with our own willingness to self-recognition that we embody first [17]6.
Examples of theory applications and discussing points
Should we consider how the outlined framework above could be applied to social 
reality at large, and is the reference to the Closed Social Groups7 (CSG) to be taken into 
5 For a more detailed articulation of this comprehensive framework see again [11], spec. Ch. 4.
6 The same Geertz underlines that “difference” does not imply the denial of “similarity.”
7 The term is based on the Robert Merton social theory and defined with several characteristics that 
are specific for the current theory of recognition. The present state of society and culture forces a person to 
be constantly involved in one or another group. Self-identification of the person arises from the comparison 
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consideration seriously? In fact, the reference to the CSG constitutes one of the best ways 
to illustrate the process of Recognition in the post-structural understanding of Otherness. 
The CSG have several features which allow us to compare social reality of Russian CSG to 
the theory of recognition, developed by our Italian colleague.
According to the anthropological research of Robin Dunbor, the maximum number 
of active connections in a group is 150 [18]. So, CSG usually do not have more members, 
and all of them permanently communicate in a closed social space. This allows the group 
to maintain direct contacts between all the members. Entering a CSG entails some com-
plications, caused by its members. A CSG is concerned greatly about new members. On 
the one hand, if the CSG includes the member, who does not share the value system, it 
produces marginality in the group. On the other hand, the CSG usually poses itself as elit-
ist among similar groups. Thus, the free expanse of the number of members results in a 
limitation of the symbolic price of a group on a social market [19].
Also, the CSG has a clear and stable structure, formal and informal leaders, so out-
siders and novices are clearly identified. The activity of a CSG is ritualized, but the rituals 
are usually incorporated into the life of the group naturally, they are not perceived by the 
group’s members. Specificity of language is also typical for CSG, both the rituals and the 
language determines the CSG values. Common public (“ethical”) values achieve their spe-
cific realization in each specific group (the so-called “emic” values).
Thus, the main characteristics of the CSG are: small size, consistency of structure, 
specific rituals and language, as well as a common manner of value specification. That 
means that the CSG have a dual social perception: they have a small community and the 
field of Others, who can or cannot enter the group.
The whole process of communication is impossible without implementation of the 
Recognition: without it the Other will not be assumed as an individual at all, but as an item 
of social surrounding, at best.
At first, the individual should be detached from the surroundings. The introduction 
of the individual to the CSG depends on the structure and specific characteristics of social 
organization in these groups. Moreover, there are different types of a “non-membered in-
dividual” in the social perception of CSG [19], meaning that individuals do not constitute 
a homogeneous social category for a CSG. During the cognitive stage of the recognition, 
the group members are trying to identify the Other as one of the type of non-members. 
Detachment of the Other from others begins.
In the case of a communal flat, a potential new member is introduced to the future 
flat-mates during an examination of the room by the owner of the flat or an agent. Flat-
mates get to know the Other just at the moment they arrived at the flat, while the Other 
usually had already separated this flat out from others by relying on photos and pieces of 
written information about the roomers (at least their quantity, sex and pernicious habits). 
Normally, one of the flatmates explains to the Other some general living rules of the flat, 
such as rules of using the common space and sharing the collective expenses and the daily 
regime of the flatmates [20]. The Other also conveys general personal information. After 
this, the cognitive stage in the CSG is finished. In this example, this first stage of the rec-
ognition process is formed by the necessity of sojourning.
of themselves with members involved in one group or another. So CSG are a special form of a voluntary 
organization of people in the community.
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The cognitive stage in office groups concludes after a successful interview. HR or the 
employer introduces a potential new colleague to the office and shows the new employee 
their workplace. It is important that the Office group, again, meets the Other for the first 
time, while the Other usually obtains information about the potential colleagues from the 
advertisement and the self-representation of the company on the Internet [21].
The nationalistic CSG is a slightly different case. Such groups are much more tradi-
tional and socially closed, as their value system is the only one thing that brings members 
into the CSG (office and flat members are forced into cohabitation). That is why the value 
system of nationalistic groups is focused on protecting them strongly from the interven-
tion of the Other. Thus, in such groups, the Others are usually introduced by old members 
with previous approval of the group or the leader. In this case, both sides are equally pre-
pared for their first contact. Thus, the cognitive stage begins prior to the actual meeting of 
the Other. CSG accepts the future intervention of the external part in advance.
The Others during the cognitive stage are specified as a separated individual, some-
times as a potential invader, which causes tension in communication between the Other 
and the group. It is results from the risk of including an “uninvolved” Other into the group. 
G. Zimmel describes the uninvolved Other in his Theory of Intersecting Social Circles as 
a specific kind of membership, that can imply a lot on a group and its social power. No 
group can be institutionalized if all of the members are not included in the group’s activi-
ties. Such a group will not have an ability to obtain completeness of itself, because not all of 
the social roles are being realized [21]. That is why the leader of the CSG will usually hold 
a first-meeting with the Other: they are responsible for the welfare of the group, while the 
individual is searching for a reference group, which is based on agreement of values or the 
influence of the group. So the Other is constrained to find some basic information on the 
group, to make the first choice between another CSG.
As we previously mentioned, formal acceptance into the group does not mean indi-
vidual participation in this group. Furthermore, recognition continues when the Other 
already shares a physical and social space with CSG. Thus, many CSG do not need only 
formal acceptation, but initiation as well. However, before the real acceptance of a new 
member, the moral stage takes place. On the moral stage of the recognition process, the 
other is being accepted as an Other, their moral values are being looked into closely in 
order to define the level of conformity between him or her and the CSG. At the same time, 
the edification of ethical (the most general) values and codes to the Other is occurring 
[21]. It is this stage when the group should understand definitely if the Other could be 
incorporated into the society.
The moral stage of the recognition process is a stage of revisions, tests, and enduranc-
es. This is the stage when a detached observer can explore the ethical system of a group’s 
values through the aspect of emical ones, as well as the purpose of the Other, and identify 
its values. Systems of ethical and emical values were explored by Itske Cramer: ethical 
values are the most general values (justice, pride, etc.), while emic values are specific for 
each group [21]. The ethical value for both organizations can be success, but for the first 
organization the emical value will be the number of arranged contracts, while for the sec-
ond one that will be the number of employees subordinate to a person. In the office-CSG, 
the Other starts to assimilate at the same time they receive their first tasks. As time passes, 
tasks start to become more complicated. During the work, the group or the boss explains 
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the main principles and convey the emical values. At the end of the moral stage, there is 
usually a test or a closing remark.
The Other, entering a new group, needs to become used to a whole new society. “…We 
shall notice, that living in the communal flat leads to specific character configuration… 
When into Communal flat arrives person, who never lived like this before, he or she has 
keen sense of disability to being alone, impossibility to escape from the flat mates… for 
member of communal flat permanent social involvement of the community is a neutral 
context” [20, p. 277]. After assimilation, the Other starts to incorporate into the group as 
an active unit: they need to clean the communal space and obtain his/her individual time 
to use it (it is common to have a timetable for using the bathroom, for example) [20].
Nationalist CSGs usually have their own codes, where their main ethical and emical 
principles are manifested, so the moral stage is shortened to several meetings. Some or-
ganizations, such as, for example, Russian National Unity, have specific tasks for reaching 
each level of the hierarchy: from patrolling the streets, to management of the whole group 
meeting. After completion of the task, the head of the organization makes a decision on 
the acceptance of the Other into the group [22].
It is important for both constituents (the group and the Other) to discover a conjunc-
tion in the value systems. The group, on the moral level, after accepting the otherness of 
the potential member, is trying to clarify if they will fill the completeness of the group [23]. 
While the aim of the Other is to understand if this group is referential for them.
The Other on the moral stage is reflecting themselves as a stranger, assuming that 
they do not know any of the values of the company or simple rules of behaviour in the 
CSG. As a result, the members of the CSG need to share some information with the Other 
to build further communication. The moral stage also helps a person to adapt.
However, close living and sharing the same space (physical and social), again, does 
not imply inclusion into the group. Furthermore, sharing the space leads to a dissociation 
problem. After the moral stage there are several scenarios of relationships. The place of the 
Other in the social surrounding is designated at the end of moral stage.
Robert Merton indicated social positions of the Other, depending on the attitudes 
of the group and of the Other for joining the group. His organization is illustrated in the 
table below.
Table. Social Position of the Other
Attitude of non-members to 
joining the group
Social position of the Other
Has a right to join Has not rights to join
Strive to join Candidates to become members Marginal
Indifferent Potential members Non-detached individuals from social surrounding
Doesn’t want to join Non-related to the group individuals
Antagonists
S o u r c e :  [19].
The stage of acceptance is the last stage of the recognition process, finalizing the whole 
previous communication of the group. The Other acquires their own social portrait after 
review of all evidence, useful and harmful, to the group. After that, the Other is allowed to 
join the group or placed in the external social surroundings.
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Membership of people into the group is provided by the same values, as it reassures 
the old-members that the Other will not separate inside the group, making it incomplete 
[23]. This works in both ways. R. Merton noticed that some people who “aspire to mem-
bership in the group… have of course incorporated the first of these motivated attitudes 
toward the membership as constituting one mechanism making for positive orientation of 
non-members toward the norms of a group” [19, p. 344].
After placing the Other in some position within the social structure, attitudes be-
tween CSG and the Other become stable.
If the Other becomes a member of the group, the CSG is starting the “educational 
process”: explaining the particulars of the language and traditions. Usually, at the accept-
ance stage, different initiation ceremonies take place. In office companies it could be an 
officially organized corporative party, during which the elders are initiating new members 
into traditions of the company. Entering a flat is usually timed to coincide with one of the 
CSG common parties, when the new member is invited to the community festivity for 
the first time. The CSG of nationalists are the most traditional ones where the joining of a 
new member can be a fully ritualized ceremony with the singing of hymns and reciting of 
oaths to the community. The more closed the group is, the more sophisticated the initia-
tion ceremony.
Non-related to the group, individuals (who are also members of the group) usually 
signal that the group has doubtful values and a life strategy in the moral context, either 
that it is socially weak or there is internal tension.
Another scenario is failure of the initiation process, due to results of the moral stage. 
The Other, in this case, does not share the traditions, specific language and other emic fea-
tures. But, the Other still knows the value system of the group, as well as the group knows 
the Other’s value system. This allows the constituents to influence attitudes between them 
in the future.
For example, the office company can maintain an individual as an external person 
with a lower or even no wage, who aspired to be marginal. The antagonism is foremost 
seen in the co-living groups, when a person does not suit the community, but is still shar-
ing the flat with others, causing different conflicts between the flatmates and possibly re-
sulting in unhealthy behaviour, such as damaging personal and even communal property. 
The most unscathed way of ending the recognition process in the case of non-entrance of 
the Other is placing them as a non-detached one, which means that the individual returns 
back to society and the relationships are finished.
In the end of the recognition process, the Other accepts their new role in the society 
and assumes the suggested behavioural strategy, or the CSG and the Other create a new 
form of communication. Social codes reflect key values of the group and become emic 
values. At the same time, the emic values are honoured as traditions. It is important to 
elaborate the communicative strategy, as common living presupposes communicative so-
ciability members of CSG to each other.
Results of the dialogue and perspectives of the theory
In this article we tried to further develop the reflections of contemporary Italian, 
Russian, and other scientists on the phenomena of recognition and re-actualization of 
“identity studies” in conjunction with historical processes, and attempted to present its 
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development and understanding, along with an analysis of the origins and current state 
of the problem, ways of philosophical comparison between various socio-demographic, 
national and socio-professional groups. The reviewed ideas propose various approaches to 
analysing recognition, such as ontological, sociological, and ethical.
According to the Russian tradition, we need to emphasize again that the term rec-
ognition was defined as perception of the Other in an individual way, nothing to do with 
the Other. The result of the recognition act is acceptance of the Other (their positive, 
and negative features, his lifestyle), which could happen even without any communica-
tion between subject and object. It was significantly restrained and focused only on an 
actor of the process (the person who recognises). In this case the important social factor 
of the term is ignored. The Other in this case is held as a passive object of the recogni-
tion process. The subject of recognition appears, in a Christian way, obliged to accept the 
Other. Russian tradition used to explain recognition as an empathic term, religious, and 
psychological.
On the contrary, the European tradition was focusing on the phenomenon that has to 
be recognised. Recognition, from the Aristotelian tradition was based on the action. The 
issue was to acknowledge features in the Other, which corresponds to what you already 
know, or to your identity. The European view was centred on this corresponding moment 
between two individuals. European recognition occurs from the recognizer to the Other, 
it is extroversive.
Nevertheless, as a result of our work, recognition is always a mutual complex process, 
and it originates from communication between two social actors. The important features 
of this process are twofold. On the one hand, we experience the intention of the Other 
to be recognised, on the other, the intention of the group to reproduce its completeness 
and internal understanding, following the rules of the recognition process. Recognition, 
in this case, is a long and complicated process of social communication, and it implies 
the actions of recogniser to acknowledge and accept the Other, as well as the activity of 
the Other, who is going to accept new concepts, their position as an Other and socialise 
in a new situation. We can discover it in contemporary everyday life, which is proved by 
examples taken from the CSG theory throughout the article. Thus, recognition is the pro-
cess that is empathic and extroversive at the same time, the actor has to produce as inner 
(ascertance and acceptance) recognition, resulting in the external (approval).
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Знание и понимание мозаичного, гипермодерного общества тесно связано с понима-
нием термина «признание». Сегодня данная тема незаслуженно потеряла популяр-
ность среди исследователей, несмотря на то что ранее занимала значительное место 
в русской философской традиции. Основные задачи статьи — основываясь на мате-
риале русской и европейской традиций уделить особое внимание новому итальянско-
му взгляду на проблему и представить актуальное понимание термина «признание». 
Философский анализ, представленный в работе, обращается к теоретическим контек-
стам постструктурализма и соответствующим методикам, включая в себя компарати-
вистский и междисциплинарный подходы. Методологический акцент делается на двух 
существенных аспектах признания: межличностном и групповом. Наш философский 
анализ признания стремится рассмотреть прежде всего проблемное поле инаковости. 
Представлены три модели инаковости, которые, в свою очередь, выдвигаются в соот-
ветствии с тремя различными моделями постановки вопроса о признании. Таким об-
разом, процесс признания Другого рассматривается в соответствии с тремя стадиями 
одобрения: когнитивной, моральной и социальной. Когнитивное одобрение включает 
в себя идентификацию Другого как противоположного группе, а также каждому от-
дельному человеку. Нравственная стадия предполагает конкретизацию социальных 
условий и принятие Другого в целом, с элементами уважения и признания. На стадии 
социального одобрения индивид признается в социальном контексте группы (закры-
той социальной группы) как признаваемый или отвергаемый. Конкретизация процес-
са признания ведет к уменьшению числа конфликтов, прояснению границ и принятию 
инаковости как неотъемлемой части индивидуальности. Изложенное здесь развитие 
теории признания является новым для российского научного контекста и важным для 
развития русско-итальянского философского диалога. Кроме того, представлена по-
пытка сравнения общего (классического и постклассического) понимания инаковости 
на основе актуальных итальянских теоретических разработок. Теория иллюстрируется 
анализом функционирования закрытых социальных групп, представленных как серия 
кейсов, что также должно способствовать развитию исследовательского интереса к из-
учению теорий социальной реальности как в российском, так и в итальянском научном 
сообществах.
Ключевые слова: признание, принятие, Другой, идентичность, закрытые социальные 
группы.
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